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INTRODUCTION

In the Netherlands, economic analysis of law has only recently begun to receive
attention. This Article will apply economic analysis of law, as it has been
developed in the United States, to Netherlands negligence liability law.
Economic analysis reduces reality into models which are intended to help
explain and guide the law. The conclusions drawn from these models hold true
within the models but can only be tentatively applied to reality. Even so,
economic analysis will contribute to the understanding of Netherlands tort law
by offering new explanations for some of the rules, and grounds of criticism for
others. Almost as important, however, are the indirect insights provided by the
use of economic analysis. The use of models requires a clarity of thinking which
questions traditional core ideas in the law. The application of economic analysis
to Netherlands negligence liability law will reveal that one of the core ideas
behind Netherlands negligence liability, the distinction between unlawfulness and
fault, is unnecessarily complicated.1
The Netherlands has a civil law system. Its rules for tort liability can be found
in the Civil Code Burgerlijk Wetboek ("BW") of 1838. In 1947, the Queen of
the Netherlands requested Professor E.M. Meijers to draft a new civil code, the
Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek ("NBW"), because it was generally felt that the law
had outgrown the 1838 version. 2 The NBW has been completed and will

The California Western International Law Journal could not verify the sources and
t
quotations contained within this Article since they are in Dutch. The author has translated the
quotations and takes sole responsibility for the Article's accuracy.
*
Meester in de Rechten (cur laude), Utrecht University, the Netherlands, 1989; LL.M.,
Harvard Law School, 1990. The author is an associate with the law firm Houthoff in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands. The author would like to thank Professor Steven Shavell, Cees van Dam, and Brian
Tamanaha for their constructive comments.
1.
This result supports the findings in two recent publications on Netherlands tort liability,
see generally G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD: ASPECTEN VAN DE ONTIWIKKELING,
OMSTREDEN, ZORVULDIGHEIDSNORM (1986) (a historical analysis of Netherlands tort law) [hereinafter
G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD]; and C.C. VAN DAM, ZORGVULDIGHEIDS-NORM EN
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID (1989) (a comparative analysis of Netherlands negligence law).
2.
CJ. VAN ZEBEN, PARLEMENTAIRE GESCHIEDENIS VAN HET NBW, ALGEMEEN DEEL,
VOORGESCHIEDENIS EN ALGEMENE INLEIDING 6-7 (1961).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

1

California
Western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1991], Art.[Vol.
3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
21

266

become effective in 1992. The NBW is not intended to change the existing law.
Rather, it has codified the law under the BW as it has developed over the last
150 years. In certain areas, however, where the courts or the doctrine were
divided, the NBW has made explicit decisions and thereby, in effect, changed the
law. To a 3certain extent the courts have already accepted these decisions as
"good law." Therefore, applicable law can be found in both the BW and the
in the present tense. However, the
NBW. Both codes are therefore discussed
4
main focus of this study is on the NBW.
This analysis of Netherlands tort law'focuses on the grounds for negligence
liability and for imputing negligence of the actor to another, so called vicarious
liability. Section I presents a brief introduction to economic analysis of tort law.
Section II provides an in depth analysis of Netherlands negligence liability law
and the application of economic analysis. Section III discusses important areas
of Netherlands vicarious liability by applying economic analysis. However, issues
relating to causation, damages, products liability,5 and the influence of insurance
on liability are beyond the scope of this Article.6 Finally, this Article concludes
that economic analysis of negligence and vicarious liability in Netherlands tort
law is consistent with economic principles.
I.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW

A. General Comments
In evaluating law, economic analysis focuses on efficiency; that is, the

relationship between the costs and benefits of legal rules.7 An important
assumption is that everything can be expressed in one uniform measure of
value.8 Cost of care can include such intangible things as time, effort, and
foregone pleasure. Accident losses can also include elements which the system
of tort law does not acknowledge, at least not for compensation, such as loss of
friendship in case of fatality.
In order to evaluate the law, the economist must set a goal for social welfare,

3.

This is called "anticipatory interpretation." See generally A.M.J. VAN BUCHEM-SPAPENS,

ANnCIPA'TIE (Monografieen NBW A-23, 1986).

4.
When interpreting the NBW, an important source of information is the legislative history
which contains the debates between the drafters, the government, and the parliament. C.J. VAN
ZEBEN & J.W. DU PONT, PARLEMENTAIRE GESCHIEDENIS VAN HET NIEUWE BURGERLIK WETBOEK,
BOEK 6, ALGEMEEN GEDEELTE VAN HET VERBINTENISSENRECHT (1981) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY

HISTORY]. Other important sources are literature by legal scholars and decisions by the Hoge Raad,

the Netherlands' highest court.
5.
For a discussion on Netherlands products liability, see M. FAURE, INLEIDING RECHTSECONOMIE 149-72 (R.W. Holzhaur & R. Teijl eds. 1989).
6.
For a discussion on this aspect, see R.W. HOLZHAUER, INLEIDING RECHTSECONOMIE 138-44
(R.W. Holzhauer & R. Teijl eds 1989).
7.
A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1989); M. FAURE & R. VAN
DEN BERGH, OBJECTIEVE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID, VERPLICHTE VERZEKERING EN VEILIGHEIDSREGULERING

38-41 (1989); R. TEIJL, INLEIDING RECHTSECONOMIE 33-40 (R.W. Holzhauer & R. Teijl eds. 1989).
8.
A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 10.
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a social optimum, against which to measure the law. The social optimum is
defined by the maximum utility derived from activities less the total accident
costs. 9 The measure for social utility will be the aggregate of the utility
individuals derive from their activities. Total accident costs consist of the sum
of the costs of care to prevent accidents and the expected accident losses.10
Expected accident losses are the probability that an accident will happen
multiplied by the losses that result when an accident happens."
Social welfare is determined by two elements: costs of accidents and utility.
The costs of accidents depends on the care people take when they engage in an
activity. The utility people derive from an activity depends on whether, and to
what extent, they engage in that activity. These two elements will be discussed
in the following sections.
B. Total Accident Costs
The total costs of accidents are determined by the losses incurred when an
accident occurs and the costs of the care taken to reduce the risk of an
accident.' 2 To evaluate whether it is worthwhile to invest in taking the care,
the (added) costs of care should be weighed against the (diminished) expected
accident losses. It makes economic sense to require such care only when an13
extra unit of care diminishes the expected accident losses by at least as much.
This can be demonstrated by Shavell's model: 4
Level
of
Care

Costs
of
Care

None
Moderate
High

0
30
70

Accident
Probability

40%
34%
26%

Accident
Losses

Expected
Accident
Losses

Total
Accident
Costs

1000
1000
1000

400
340
260

400
370
330

In this case the optimal level of care is "High." A high level of care results in
the lowest total accident costs. Taking high care substantially reduces the chance
of an accident. For the additional cost of 40, the expected accident losses is
reduced by 80. It is therefore socially worthwhile to make this investment.' 5
Therefore, the liability rules governing a person's conduct when engaging in this

9.
See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21 (1987). This social goal
follows from the choice to evaluate law by focusing on efficiency. If another social goal was chosen,
the analysis may be different.
10.
Id. at 7.
11.
Id at 6.
12.
The extent of damage when an accident occurs is also a determination.
13.

W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 60 (1987).

14.
15.

See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 7.
By varying the figures, any level of care can be found to be optimal.
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activity should induce a person to take a high level of care.1

C. Utility

Next to the level of care, the utility people derive from participating in an
activity is relevant for reaching the social optimum. This depends on whether,
and to what extent, people engage in such activity. It is efficient for a person to
engage in the activity only when the (extra) utility a person derives from
engaging in the activity, or engaging more frequently in the activity, exceeds the
(additional) costs of accidents. Shavell illustrates this idea through the following
model. 17 Assume the level of care is determined by the figures of the preceding
model. Further assume that the actors are induced to take the appropriate
degree of care. The cost of care is 70 and the expected accident loss is 260.
Two more assumptions must be made. An increase in the level of activity will
proportionally increase the expected accident losses, and an increase in the level
of activity will increase the actor's utility.
Level of
Activity
0
1
2
3

Total
Utility
0
600
800
900

Total Expected
Costs Accident
Losses
0
70
140
210

0
260
520
780

Total
Accident
Costs

Social
Welfare

0
330
660
990

0
270
140
90

In this model the socially optimal level of activity is 1. The sixth column reflects
the effect that the level of activity has on the social welfare. At level 1 the social
welfare is highest. It would be a social waste if the actor would engage more
than once in the activity, but also if the actor would not engage at all. The
utility derived from engaging once in the activity (600) exceeds the cost incurred
(330). Yet, after engaging once, the increase in utility derived from the activity
(200) is less than the increase in total accident costs (330). Liability rules
governing the actor's conduct when engaging in this activity
should be such that
8
the actor would be induced to participate exactly once.
One more aspect of utility must be discussed here. The implicit assumption
so far has been that individuals are risk neutral, that is, that their decisions are
only influenced by the expected losses, the potential magnitude of the losses
multiplied by the probability of these losses. A risk neutral person is indifferent
to the choice between a 0.1% chance of a loss of 10,000 or a 10% chance of a
16.
See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 6-17.
17.
Id at 21-23.
18.
See generally A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 46-49; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 21-30.
Lander and Posner use a model with equations to demonstrate the same idea shown by Shavell's
models. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 54-62.
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loss of 100.19 However, this may not always be the case. A person might be
risk averse. Risk averse individuals will be influenced in their decisions by the
potential magnitude of the loss. A person's attitude towards risk depends on the
size of the loss in relation to the assets and the needs of that individual.20
When a person is risk averse, a small chance of a large loss can decrease his
or her utility more than a larger chance of a smaller loss. The liability rules
therefore do not just affect social welfare through their influence on the expected
accident losses. They also affect social welfare by determining who faces the
magnitude of the loss. It will be socially beneficial to shift the loss away from
people who are risk averse to people who are risk neutral.21 To simplify the
analysis, the general assumption will be that individuals
are risk neutral or at
22
least that their attitudes toward risk are similar.
D. Liability Rules Compared

Liability rules can be distinguished in two categories: negligence liability and
strict liability. The important distinction between negligence liability and strict
liability is that negligence liability requires an assessment as to whether the
defendant acted wrongfully, that is, contrary to what was required of him or her,
while strict liability does not require this inquiry. 23
In the above model it does not make a difference whether the actor is subject
to negligence or strict liability. 24 Under the assumptions that courts, victims,
and tortfeasors all have perfect information and that the court establishes the
level of due care in accordance with the socially optimal level of care, a
tortfeasor will take due care under either liability rule. If the negligence rule
applies, he or she will not be found taking less than due care. Doing so would
expose the tortfeasor to liability for the accident costs which he or she could
have avoided for the lesser cost of care. If the strict liability rule applies, the
tortfeasor will also take due care. Not taking the appropriate level of care would
unnecessarily increase the tortfeasor's total cost of accidents. Taking too much
care would have the same effect 25
A complication of this model is that it is generally not possible for the courts

19.
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 6.
20.
Id. at 186-92.
21.
Id at 190, 207.
22.
Landes and Posner justify this assumption by pointing out that in cases in which the
potential losses are substantial, in relation to the wealth of the person at risk, risk neutrality can be
created through insurance. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 57.
23.
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 6. This description of negligence includes intentional wrongful
conduct. Sometimes strict liability may require an inquiry into the conduct of someone the defendant
is responsible for. For example, an employer is liable for the harm caused by his or her employee
only if the employee's conduct violated applicable norms of behavior. This form of liability is called
vicarious liability.
24.
Which liability regime applies does make a difference for the distribution of income.
25.
W.M. LANDES & R.M. POSNER, supra note 13, at 64; A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 40-

42; and S.

SHAVELL,

supra note 9, at 9.
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to include in the standard of care the level of activity and the utility a person
derives from engaging in an activity. Both determining what the actual level of
activity is and determining what the optimal level of activity is present almost
unsurmountable evidentiary hurdles.26 If the optimal level of activity is not part
of the standard of care, the liability rules create different incentives for
preventing inefficient costs. Under strict liability, the actor will choose both the
optimal level of care and the optimal level of activity. The actor will be induced
to do so because his or her costs will equal the accident costs when engaging in
the activity. However, under negligence liability the result will not be optimal.
Under negligence liability, the actor will take due care, but will engage
excessively in the activity. Taking due care will prevent liability. The accident
costs when engaging in the activity will therefore
remain where they fall and will
7
not influence the actor's level of activity.2
There are many more refinements to the model described above, taking into
account different aspects which make the model more realistic. 8 For the exact
development of these refinements, there are various handbooks on economic
analysis referred to throughout this Article.29
II.

NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY

A. The Goal of Tort Law

From the above discussion of economic analysis, it is apparent that economic
analysis perceives prevention of inefficient costs as the primary goal of tort
law. 30 Laws governing liability should be aimed at inducing people to take
31
optimal care and participate in activities at an optimal level.
In the Netherlands, little attention is paid to the aims of tort law. Generally,
"compensation" is perceived to be the goal of tort law. 32 Prevention or
deterrence of certain conduct is not seen as a goal of tort law. 33 Recently Van

26.
A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 49; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 25.
27.
W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 66-67; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 23-24.
28.
A fundamental complication of this model, not discussed in this Article, is taking into
account that plaintiffs can (be required to) take care also. With respect to this complication under
Netherlands law, see R.W. HOLZHAUER, supra note 6, at 130-32.
29.
See generally W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13; A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 7;
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9; M. FAURE & R. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 7; R.W. HOLZHAUER & R.
TEIL, supra notes 2, 3 & 7.
30.
This includes optimal allocation of risk. Compare S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 192
("[A]llocation of risk is in principle just as important a determinant of social welfare as ... the
reduction of accident losses.") Id
31.
See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 298.
32.
A.R. BLOEMBERGEN, SCHADEVERGOEDING: ALGEMEEN, DEEL 1, 2 (Monogafieen NBW B34, 1982); WJ. SLAGTER, DE RECHI-SGROND VAN DE SCHADEVERGOEDING BU ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD
8, 187 (1952).
33.
See A.R. BLOEMBERGEN, supra note 32, at 6-7; WJ. SLAGTER, supra note 32, at 186-87.
According to Van Dam, this holds true for most European writers. See C.C. VAN DAM, supra note
1, at 213 n.1. See also M. FAURE & R. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 7, at 19. But see G.E.
LANGEMEDER, DE GEREC-TIGHEID IN ONS BURGERLIJK VERMOGENSRECHT 35, 73 (1983). For a
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alone provides an insufficient explanation
Dam pointed out that compensation
34
or justification for tort liability.
Compensation, as the goal of tort law, does not explain why damages can only
be recovered through the tort system if the injury was wrongfully caused.35 If
compensation was the primary goal, a system of strict liability would be more
appropriate. 36 This would mean that, whenever harm is caused, the one causing
it would have to compensate the victim. Such a system was explicitly discarded
by the drafters of the NBW. Only in an enumerated number of situations will
liability be imposed regardless of whether the defendant's conduct was
wrongful. 37 Furthermore, if the objective of tort law is compensation,
alternatives exist which would be less costly and more effective than tort
liability. 38 For example, the already elaborate Netherlands social insurance
system could be expanded to cover any and all injuries inflicted by another.39
According to economic analysis, compensation alone does not contribute to
the social welfare. It merely shifts a loss from one person to another and, in
doing so, creates unjustified administrative costs. The main goal of tort law
should be prevention, not compensation.4
An important assumption of
economic analysis is that people are guided by efficiency." They will act
according to their best economic interest. 42 Therefore, if individuals are
required to bear the costs of their conduct, they will only engage in this conduct
if it is efficient for them to do so. The threat of liability then deters people from
creating inefficient costs.
Economic analysis also contends that, to a certain degree, the law in actual
operation is consistent with the prevention of inefficient CoStS.4 3 Whether
Netherlands negligence liability actually is consistent with the prevention of
inefficient costs depends on the standard for wrongful conduct. If conduct is
held to be wrongful when it causes inefficient costs, economic analysis may claim

different perspective with respect to common law, see W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
25-26 (P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
34.
C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 199-254.
35.
Id at 230-33.
36.
M. FAURE & R. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 7, at 31.
37.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 605-06, 612-14; C.H.M. JANSEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD: ALGEMENE BEPALINGEN, 15 (Monografieen NBW B-45, 1986).
38.
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTs 80 (1970). In the U.S., almost two-thirds of the
payments in tort cases go towards administrative costs. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note
13, at 57-58. See AM. POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 9-10; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 296.
39.
See C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 234-37.
40.
See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 38; R. TEUL, supra note 7, at 9-10.
41.
M. FAURE & R. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 7, at 34; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 2; R.
TEIJL, supra note 8, at 25.
42.
For a critical discussion of this assumption, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 107.
43.
M. FAURE & R. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 7, at 30-32; W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER,
supra note 13, at 8, 18, 19, 23; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 297-98.
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vindication.4
B. Wrongful Conduct

Negligence liability is liability for wrongful conduct.45 Under Netherlands
law, liability for wrongful conduct requires that the defendant (1) commits an
unlawful act, and (2) that the act can be attributed to him or her. In the NBW,
the core provision on tort liability states that "[hie who commits an unlawful act
towards another, which can be attributed to him, is obliged to compensate the
damage the other suffered as a consequence thereof."46 The phrasing differs
from the core provision of the BW which states that "[e]very unlawful act which
causes damage to another47 obliges the person by whose fault that damage was
caused to compensate it."
The distinctive difference between the new and the old code is that the new
code speaks of "attribution" where the old code speaks of "fault."48 The drafters
did not intend to change the law by this different phrasing. Their intention was
merely to codify the interpretation that courts and legal scholars have given the
phrase "by whose fault" over the years.49
The understanding codified in the NBW is that tort liability requires a two-step
analysis. First, it must be established that the act was wrong. Second, it must
be established that the actor was wrong.50 To establish negligence liability, the
requirement of unlawfulness Iqualifies the act, and the requirement of fault or
attribution qualifies the actor. '
Professor Meijers, who drafted this part of the NBW, understood the BW's
phrase "by whose fault" to require a state of mind of the actor which made his
or her act reprehensible. 5 This requirement for negligence liability was
experienced to describe why the actor should be liable. 53 The NBW therefore
replaced the old phrase "by whose fault" with "attribution." The NBW currently
provides: "An unlawful act can be attributed to its actor if it is due to his fault

In addition, economic analysis will also have to show that the rules for strict liability are
44.
consistent with the goal of prevention of inefficient costs. This is mostly outside the scope of this
article.
See supra section I.D.
45.
46.
Art. 6:162 § 1 NBW. Apart from the two requirements singled out in this study, negligence
liability also requires causation, damage, and a showing that the violated norm was intended to protect
the damaged interest. A.S. HARTKAMP, VERBINTENISSENRECHT, DEEL III, DE VERBINTENIS UIT DE WET
(1990).
47.
Art. 1401 BW.
48.
VAN

D.C. FOKKEMA, INTRODUCTION To DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 138 (1978); C.C.

DAM, supra note 1, at 73.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 604, 629; C.H.M.
49.
50.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 618.

JANSEN,

supra note 37, at 45.

51.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 70; G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra
note 1, at 205-06; A PrrLo, HET SYSTEEM VAN HET NEDERLANDSE PRIVAATRECHT NAAR HET NIEUWE

BURGERLIJK WErBOEK 398 (1988); W.J. SLAGTER, supra note 32, at 2.
52.
E.M. MEIJERS, ALGEMENE BEGRIPPEN VAN HEr BURGERLUK REcHT 300 (1948).
53.
See infra section II.E.1.
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or to a cause which is at his peril by virtue of a statute or the views current in
society."s4 In summary, the NBW maintains the two-step analysis of wrongful
conduct, requiring both the act and the actor to be wrong, but the actor does not
necessarily have to be "at fault" in order to be wrong.5"
C. An Unlawful Act
An unlawful act is defined in the NBW as "an infringement of a right or an act
or omission contrary to a statutory duty or contrary to what according to
unwritten law is due in society.... ,S6 This is a codification of the Hoge Raad's
influential decision in Lindenbaurn v. Cohen. 7 In that case, the Hoge Raad
resolved the issue whether "unlawful" under article 1401 of the BW should be
interpreted as "contrary to written law" or whether it has a broader application.
The Hoge Raad held that "by unlawful act is to be understood an act or
omission which infringes upon another's right, or conflicts with the defendant's
statutory duty, or is contrary.. . to the carefulness which is due in society with
regard to another's person or property."58 The drafters of the NBW did not
intend any substantive difference by describing "the care due in society" as "what
according to unwritten law is due in society." 9 For the sake of simplicity, this
category is usually called "societal care. "60
"Infringement of a right" refers to the rights of others, such as the right not to
be harmed or property rights. 61 Even though contract liability is regarded as
a species of tort liability, contractual rights are generally not enforced through
tort liability but through the separate body of contract law.62 "Contrary to the
actor's statutory duty" refers to a violation of any general duty derived from a
statute, regulation, permit, or the like.6 This violation, like the violation of

54.
Art. 6:162 § 3 NBW.
For a discussion of this, see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
55.
Art. 6:162 § 2 NBW.
56.
HR 31 Jan. 1919, NJ 1919, 161.
57.
58. Translation provided by D.C. FOKKEMA, supra note 48, at 137-38. The Hoge Raad also
held that an act or omission contrary to good morals constitutes an unlawful act. This clause was
seldom used by the courts and was therefore ignored by the drafters of the NBW. C.C. VAN DAM,
supra note 1, at 73. According to Van Maanen, the impact on the extent of negligence liability of this
decision was less than it appears at first glance, because both article 1402 of the BW (now
preempted) and the requirement of "fault" in article 1401 of the BW were used to establish liability
on unwritten law until this decision in 1919, G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note
1, at 166.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 616. For an objection to this stylistic change,
59.
see C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 73.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 45.
60.
61.
Id at 37; C.H.M JANSEN, supra note 37, at 38-39; PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4,
at 614.
62.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 8.
Id at 35; PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 615.
63.
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societal care, can occur either by an act or by a failure to act. 64 The term
#unlawful act" is used to refer to both acts or failures to act when establishing
unlawfulness. Violation of the care due in society is determined by a weighing
of competing interests.6
In this Article, according to the economic model, negligence liability should
be imposed when the actor fails to take optimal care. The third ground of
Netherlands unlawfulness, acting contrary to societal care, may turn out to be
similar to this economic model. Before analyzing whether the Netherlands duty
of societal care is comparable to optimal care under an economic analysis, it is
necessary to understand how the duty of societal care relates to the first two
grounds for establishing unlawful conduct: infringement upon a right and breach
of a statutory duty.
Generally, whenever a person infringes upon the rights of another, or violates
a statutory duty, that person has acted contrary to the care due in society.
Whether this is actually the case depends upon the specific circumstances of the
situation. If the provision violated was drafted to prevent the particular kind of
harm suffered by the plaintiff, the case is clear. In that situation, the legislature
has already weighed the interests of the parties and decided in favor of one of
them. Thus, there is little discretion for the judge to evaluate whether the act
was careless. 66
Yet, sometimes an act infringes upon a right or breaches a statutory duty but
may not be considered contrary to the care due in society due to the circumstances of the case. A recurring discussion in the Netherlands is whether this
can be considered an unlawful act. Beginning in 1938 with Smits, and as recently
as Van Dam's 1989 study on negligence, a number of authors have argued that
such an act should not be considered unlawful. 67 The arguments, although
along varying lines, can be summarized as concluding that only a violation of the
standard of care should be considered an unlawful act. Proof of "infringement
upon a right" or "breach of a statutory duty" should be considered a rebuttable
presumption that the act indeed violated societal care. 6s According to these
authors, this is actually the way the courts deal with the problem. 69

64.
Contrary to U.S. law, under Netherlands law it is a crime not to aid someone in danger.
See Art. 459 Criminal Code. On the efficiency of liability for omissions, see W.M. LANDES & R.A.
POSNER, supra note 13, at 145.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 45.
65.
66.
C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 79-80.
67.
Smits, lets Over de Vraag derRelativiteitvan de OnrechtmatigeDaadin Verband met de Door
den Hoogen Raad Onderscheiden Onrechtmatigheidsvormen, WEEKBLAD VOOR HET PRIVAATRECHT,
NOTARIAAT EN REGISTRATIE 3586-91 (1938); and Smits, Aantasting en uitoefening van subjectieve
rechten in Hare Betekenis voor de Onrechtmatige Daad, WEEKBLAD VOOR HET PRIVAATRECHT,
NOTARIAAT EN REGIsTRArnE 3688-90 (1940). See generally C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1.
Other participants in this discussion are cited by A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 57-58.
68.
B.J. ENGELEN, DE ROL VAN DE WETELLKE GEDRAGSNORM BIJ HET ONRECHTMATIGHEIDSO69.
ORDEEL OP GROND VAN ARnKEL 1401 BW RM THEMIS 208-24 (1986); C.C. VAN DAM, supra note
1, at 76-80. An example often cited in support of this position is Breda v. Nijs HR 25 Sept. 1981, NJ
1982, 315; C.H.M. JANSEN, supra note 37, at 38, claims that the Hoge Raad is inconsistent in this
case.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol21/iss2/3

10

van
Schilfgaarde:
NegligenceUNDER
Under the
Netherlands
Civil Code
Economic Analys
CODE
THE
NETHERLANDS
CIVIL-- An
NEGLIGENCE
1991]

The drafters of the NBW have not accepted the "Smits approach." 70 The
NBW cites all three grounds as independent grounds for establishing that an act
was unlawful. The sole proof of either the infringement of a right, or the breach71
of a statutory duty, is sufficient to establish that the act was unlawful.
However, the drafters acknowledged that under certain circumstances the
consequences of this approach may be "unacceptable,"72 so they designed several
modifications to this general rule. It can be argued that the effect of these
"modifications" is that the ultimate test for unlawfulness is whether the act
violated due care.
According to the Secretary of State, the first two grounds for unlawfulness
should be read to establish "prima facie evidence" of unlawfulness. 73 This
evidence can be rebutted by showing a defense justifying the act which infringed
upon a right or violated a statutory duty. This "modification" is made by adding
the phrase "except in as far as a ground of justification is present" to the phrase
"an unlawful act is. .. ."14 The grounds of justification or defenses include at
least the ones enumerated in the Criminal Code, 75 but are not explicitly limited
to those.
According to Meijers, "civil law, even more so than criminal law, has a need
for recognition of other grounds of justification than those immediately derived
from statutes."7 6 One of those unwritten grounds of justification, according to
some authors, could be that the act "did not violate due care."77
Whatever may be the precise grounds of justification admitted to rebut a prima
facie unlawful act, it is clear that a separate weighing of interests can be made
after it is established that the act "infringed upon a right" or "violated a statutory
duty of care," to determine whether the act was unlawful. 78 This is similar to
the effect the "Smits approach" would have. 79
A second modification to the rigidness of the first two grounds of unlawfulness
the NBW drafters allowed for was the requirement of attribution. As a general
matter, according to Meijers, the defendant bears the burden of proof to deny
that the act should be attributed to the defendant. However, when unlawfulness
of the act is based solely upon infringement of a right or breach of a statutory

70.
71.

C.H.M. JANSEN, supra note 37, at 34, 39.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 614-15.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id at 617.
Id. at 614-15, 626.
Art. 6:162 § 2 NBW.
Art. 40 Criminal Code.

76.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617.
77.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 66; C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 86; Engelen writes
that any ground of justification is an acknowledgement that the act did not violate due care. B.J.
ENGELEN, supra note 69, at 224,
G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 220-21. See also H.
78.
SCHOORDIJX, HET ALGEMENE GEDEELTE VAN HET VERBINTENISSENRECHT NAAR HET NBW 366-67
(1979).
79.
Hartkamp seems to say that this is precisely the idea. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at
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duty, the court often requires the plaintiff to show that the actor was careless.80
This modification, therefore, tests whether the person, as opposed to the act, was
careless through the requirement of attribution. As will be argued below, what
establishes carelessness of the act and carelessness of the person is the same.
Therefore, this modification through attribution does exactly what the "Smits
approach" would do, namely, applying as the ultimate test for wrongful conduct
a determination of whether the act was careless. 8'
The NBW sets out three independent grounds for unlawfulness. Yet, there are
serious doubts whether this approach is superior to the approach which holds
that there is only one general ground for unlawfulness. In any case, the outcome
of either approach is the same. Under the NBW, carelessness will be the
ultimate test for wrongful conduct, whether it will be through the grounds of
justification or through the requirement of attribution.n2 The NBW's approach
is unnecessarily complicated. Throughout the remainder of this Article,
"unlawful act" will be used as synonymous with "lack of due care," "violation of
the standard of care," and the like. The following section will analyze what
constitutes lack of due care under Netherlands negligence liability law.
D. Careful Behavior
1. A Description by the Hoge Raad. The Hoge Raad described the standard of

care in a 1965 decision.83 In that case, an employee of Coca Cola Export
Corporation, carrying a new supply of soda into the cellar of Cafe de Munt in
Amsterdam, left the hatch to the cellar open. The plaintiff, on his way to the
men's room, did not notice the open hatch and fell in and injured his leg. When
this case reached the Hoge Raad, it described the standard of care as being: "the
probability that the required attentiveness and care will not be taken [by the
potential victims], the probability that harm will result, the possible extent of the
harm, and" the
extent of the defendant's objection to taking appropriate safety
4
measures. 8
These elements can be translated into the elements of the economic model.
The first element, taking into account the likelihood that the victim will not take
the required care, is part of the general probability of harm. "Required care" of
the victim in this case refers to the victim's own duty of care.6 The extent of
the harm speaks for itself. The defendant's objection to taking appropriate
safety measures refers to the economic "cost of care." Here, the defendant had

80.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 618.
81.
See C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 87; G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra
note 1, at 226-27.
82.
C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 87.
83.
HR 5 Nov. 1965, NJ 1966, 136, annot. A comparable description of the standard of care
is given in HR 18 Dec. 1987, NJ 1988, 350 VR 1988, 91 and HR 9 Jan. 1981, NJ 1981, 227, annot.
84.
HR 5 Nov. 1965, NJ 1966, annot.
85.
The Hoge Raad held that the victim was also at fault, and thus reduced Coca Cola's
obligation to compensate him by half.
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taken some care; he had left some crates of soda in front of the hatch. The
question was whether that care sufficed or whether he should have taken
additional care. The court of appeals had determined that a simple barricade by
chairs would have prevented the accident from happening. By not doing so, the
Coca Cola employee was at fault. The Hoge Raad upheld the court of appeals'
decision. In economic analysis terms, the costs of additional care were slight.
Additional care would have substantially reduced the expected accident losses
due to the reduction in the probability that harm would have occurred.
Therefore, the defendant's behavior violated the standard of care.8
2

A Closer Examination of Careful Behavior. In the literature, it is seldom

explored what exactly constitutes societal or due care. This may be due to the
fact that the exact standard of care depends on, among other things, the type of
activity and the circumstances of the case. It is regarded as a question of fact,
and academic lawyers, especially academic civil lawyers, seldom discuss issues of
fact. However, Van Dam has discussed in more detail what constitutes careless
behavior.8 7 Van Dam's conclusions provide useful guidance for the analysis of
Netherlands negligence liability law.
Van Dam distinguishes four elements that courts take into account when
determining due care. These elements, like the elements stated by the Hoge
Raad, are similar to the elements distinguished by economic analysis as relevant
for tort liability. The elements distinguished by Van Dam are: (1) the character
and extent of the injury; (2) the probability of the harm; (3) the objection to
taking the necessary care; and (4) the character of the activity.
a. The Characterand Extent of the Injury. The character and extent of the

injury refers to the harm that is generally caused by certain behavior. By
referring separately to the "character" and the "extent" of the injury, Van Dam
implies that the character of the injury is a separate element in determining the
standard of care. 9 Different kinds of injuries would then result in applying
different standards of care. Van Dam's division appears to be aimed at the
distinction between monetary injury and pain and suffering. It is based on the
premise that pain and suffering is different from other forms of injuries because
it has no monetary measure.
This distinction is unnecessary for the standard of care. When establishing the
standard of care, the court has to weigh the care the defendant could have taken
against the loss that resulted when such care was not taken. 90 In order to do
so, the court has to have some perception of a standard which expresses both

Similarly R.W. HOLZHAUER, supra note 3, at 128.
86.
87.
C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1. Van Dam's study is not solely based on Netherlands tort law.
He also uses comparative material of West German, French, and English tort law. Van Dam cites
L. BIER, AANSPRAKELIJKHEID VOOR BEDRUFSONGEVALLEN EN BEDRIJFS-ZIEKTEN (1988).

88.
89.
90.

C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 110.
Id at 111.
Id at 223.
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pecuniary and non-pecuniary values. Pain and suffering tends to weigh heavily
in determining the extent of the injury, but it has no absolute or independent
value which would prevent the court from offsetting it against monetary costs. 91
It is therefore not necessary to identify the character or kind of injury as a
separate element of the standard of care. The qualification "kind of injury" is
part of the element "extent of the injury" with the understanding that personal
injury tends to imply that the extent of the injury is significant. 92
Under an economic analysis, no distinction is made between different types of
injuries. All are, by assumption, measurable in monetary terms. The appropriate award for personal injury may be determined by using the amount someone
would be willing to pay to buy off a chance of getting hurt. 93 This idea is
94
problematic because it is difficult to establish what that amount would be.
For the present discussion, all that is relevant is that if the injury which would
be incurred in an accident includes personal injury or even death, the monetary
expression of that injury will be high to very high. Therefore, under the
economic model, lack of due care will easily be established when life and limb
are at peril.
It may be concluded that tort theory and the economic model contain a similar
interpretation of the extent of injury as one of the elements of the standard of
care.

b. The Probabilityof injury. The probability of injury is the chance that harm
may result from certain behavior. The probability that harm could follow from
a certain act is relevant in relation to both the extent of the injury and the cost
of care which would reduce the probability. This implies that the degree of
probability of injury itself does not provide information on whether the behavior
was careless. 95 This is illustrated by an example of careless behavior the
drafters of the NBW gave. If, without looking, a driver turns onto a road seldom
used by other cars and an accident occurs, he or she will be held liable. % The
economic model offers an explanation for this result. Assume that the following
figures would apply:

91.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 17, 213. Calabresi points out that it is a myth that society
is committed to preserving life at any cost. Van Dam points out that in the Netherlands courts, a
tendency exists to let inflicting personal injury automatically establish unlawfulness. C.C. VAN DAM,
supra note 1, at 111.
92.
The amounts of compensation for non-pecuniary harm are much smaller in the Netherlands
than they are in the U.S. In 1985, the highest amount ever awarded was fl. 250,000 which equals
approximately $125,000. 38 Verkeersrecht, No. 6, 1990, at 81 (Smartegeld).
93.
W.M. LANDES R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 187-89; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 234.
94.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 206.
95.
The same holds true of course for the other elements of careless behavior.
96.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 343-44.
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Care

Costs of
Care

Probability
of Harm

Expected Accident Losses

Total Accident Costs

No Care
Care

0
1

1%
0

10
0

10
1

When an automobile accident occurs, it will cause a harm of 1000. The harm
in this example could consist of injury to both the car and person and is
therefore likely to be relatively large. The probability that an accident occurs is
low (1%). The cost of preventing the harm, reducing the probability to zero or
close to zero, is low (1) as was the case in the example above. Very little effort
or time is involved in looking before turning onto a road. The model shows it
is optimal to take care, since the total cost of accidents when the actor takes the
appropriate care is 1 whereas the total cost is 10 when the actor does not take
the appropriate care. Therefore, not taking care to prevent an implausible
accident is, in this case, unlawful behavior.
c. Objectionability of Taking Care. The cost of care alone will not provide
information on whether the standard of care is violated. Again, the elements of
the standard of care are interdependent. An example of low cost of care in
combination with high damage was just discussed above. 97 An example of
comparative high cost of care is presented in Bey v. Guyt. Mrs. Bey and Mrs.
Guyt were both waiting at a bus stop. Mrs. Bey took a step backwards and
bumped into Mrs. Guyt. Mrs. Guyt, an elderly lady, fell and broke her hip.9s
The Hoge Raad called it "an unfortunate sequence of events" and did not hold
Mrs. Bey liable.
This result is consistent with the economic model. The probability of harm in
taking one step backwards without checking to see if anyone is behind you may
be debatable, but it cannot be extremely high. Mrs. Guyt suffered substantial
personal injuries, thus the extent of the harm was rather high. Yet it seems fair
to say that, generally, when we take one step backwards, the risk of injury is
relatively minor. Mrs. Guyt was more vulnerable than the average person.
Therefore, even though her injury was substantial, the injury considered in the
standard of care in these situations may be less. If that is the case, looking over
our shoulder every time we take a single step backwards may be too high a cost,
compared to the low probability of knocking someone over when doing so
multiplied by the injury which would generally result.
L Characterof the Activity. Van Dam's last category is "the character of the
activity." This element plays a key role in determining the standard of care.99
To illustrate this, he describes how the standard of care will be less rigid when

97.
98.
99.

See also HR 27 May 1988, NJ 1989, 29 annot., VR 1988, 142.
HR 11 Dec. 1987, NJ 1988, 393, annot, VR 1988, 77 annot.
C.C. vAN DAM, supra note 1, at 120, 131.
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the activity, by its character, does not impose a great danger in society (e.g.,
walking), whereas the standard of care will be very high when the character of
the activity is dangerous (e.g., driving an automobile), t°° Van Dam's illustration is not convincing to show that "character of conduct" is a separate element
for the standard of care. It is true that the relative danger accompanying certain
conduct has a substantial influence on the appropriate standard of care.
However, this is already incorporated in the standard of care through the
elements "extent of the injury" and "probability of the injury."
In accordance with Van Dam, it can still be argued that the character of the
conduct has a key role in determining the standard of care. The required care
(the relative weight of the elements of the standard of care) is determined case
by case and depends on the conduct at issue. There is no general careful
behavior. Whether it suffices to look over your shoulder when participating in
an activity will depend on the type of activity in which you are participating.101
3. Summary. An act is unlawful when it is contrary to the care due in society.
The elements that constitute a careless act are consistent with the economic
model. The standard of care is a function of the cost of care, the probability of
injury, and the extent of injury. Netherlands negligence liability law can
therefore be said to be consistent with the economic aim of preventing inefficient
costs.

This is not meant to say that courts actually make their decisions based on
figures derived from an economic calculation of care.'02 But the conclusion
that the decisions made are consistent with this calculation adds insight into the
law and thereby increases the ability to evaluate it.
Thus far, maximizing utility, as relevant to the standard of care, has not been
discussed. Economic analysts acknowledge that this aspect in determining
optimal care is even more difficult, if at all possible, to incorporate into the
standard of care.103 For activities in which the derived utility is important in
establishing due care, strict liability may be the preferred form of liability. Strict
liability would induce the actors to incorporate the utility of their activities in
determining their optimal level of care.1t 4 First, however, the requirement of
attribution is addressed.

100. Id. at 131.
101. The character of the activity may be relevant to the aspect of care that has not yet been
discussed, namely taking care by participating less in an activity or by not participating at all. This
will be discussed in infra section II.F.1.
102. "The claim is hardly made that individuals or courts think in terms of the mathematical
goal of minimizing a sum. They obviously do not do anything so unnatural. Rather, they appear to
gauge the appropriateness of behavior by a rough consideration of risk and the costs of reducing it,
ordinarily on the basis of felt notions of fairness." (footnote omitted) S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at
19.
103. See supra section I.D.
104. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 26, 31-32.
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E. Attribution
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the Netherlands standard for
unlawful conduct resembles the economic standard of care. However, as stated
above, Netherlands negligence liability is based on two requirements.' t5 In
order to establish wrongful conduct, the actor must commit an unlawful act, and
the unlawful act has to be attributed to the actor. This section will discuss what
the requirement of attribution adds to the already established unlawful act.
1. The Requirement of Attribution. Under the BW, the actor had to be "at
fault" in order to be liable for an unlawful or careless act. The NBW has
expanded the fault requirement. An actor is liable if the unlawful act can be
attributed to the actor either: (1) by the actor's fault; (2) by virtue of a statute;
or (3) by virtue of the views current in society."° Even so, the core requirement in both codes, qualifying the actor as opposed to the act, is fault. The
other two grounds for attribution are intended as modifications where fault was
experienced to describe why the actor should be liable.
The requirement of fault was experienced as ill-fitting in situations where the
actor was held liable for an unlawful act, but in which the word "fault" seemed
like an undeserved reproach. "[Clertain factors exist that the actor will be held
accountable for

. . .

even though the actor in this specific instance cannot be

reproached for that factor . . ,107 The drafters give as an example that an
inexperienced driver may be held liable for making a mistake an experienced
driver would not have made. 1'8 Under the NBW, the unlawful act will, in such
circumstances, be attributed to the actor "by virtue of the views current in
society" rather than by his or her "fault."
At the same time, the BW "fault" excluded liability the drafters felt should not
be excluded. A mental patient may not be able to perceive the wrongfulness of
his or her actions, in which case "fault" is absent. The general rule under the
BW is that liability is then denied.1°9 Attribution "by virtue of a statute" is
used by the drafters of the NBW to decide this issue on the capacity to commit
an unlawful act. ° The NBW includes a provision stating that unlawful acts
will be attributed to mental patients, regardless of their actual capacity to
understand the wrongfulness of their actions.'
The following sections will discuss attribution of an act to the actor due to

105.
106.
107.
6:162 § 3
108.
109.
110.
G.E. VAN
111.

See supra section II.B.
See art. 6:162 § 3 NBW.
Professor Meijers in his memorandum to the parliament concerning the draft of article
NBW, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 618.
Id
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 73, 77; C.H.M. JANSEN, supra note 37, at 67.
It is also used in article 6:167 § 2, a very specific provision not relevant for this study. See
MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 202.
Art. 6:165 NBW.
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fault in two different interpretations: a subjective sense and an objective sense.
Then, attribution by virtue of a statute and attribution by virtue of the views
current in society will be examined.
2. Fault in the Subjective Sense. The first problem with fault qualifying the

actor as opposed to the act, is that it is unclear whether this should be a
subjective or an objective test. When used as a subjective test, it refers to the
individual's state of mind at the time of the tort. When fault is used as an
objective test, it refers to a general standard of carelessness of the actor. 12
The parliamentary history does not explicitly state whether fault should be read
in a subjective or an objective sense. 113 Hartkamp, author of the leading
treatise on the NBW, writes:
The requirement of fault in articles 1401 and 162 must be understood
in a subjective sense ....

Even though it is true that generally for

the inquiry into fault it suffices to establish what can be expected of
someone in similar circumstances as the actor, this does not deny that
in the end, decisive is whether the actor in this case can be reproached
for his act. In the new law attribution by virtue of the current social
viev~s 4 or a statute may be available if reproachability is not pres11
ent.
According to Hartkamp's reasoning, the defendant will be relieved from liability
if he or she can show a lack of subjective fault."' The act may have been
unlawful, but the actor was not reprehensible in doing so. Therefore the conduct
was not wrongful.
Under the BW, lack of subjective fault only relieves the actor from liability in
those cases where the defendant does not understand the nature of his or her
actions due to tender age or mental disorder." 6 The defendant has to show a
"total lack of awareness of the unlawfulness" of his or her actions." 7 These
situations are provided for differently in the NBW. As discussed above, an
unlawful act will be attributed to a mental patient regardless of the patient's
understanding of the nature of his or her behavior.11 8 On the other hand, the
NBW states that an unlawful act cannot be attributed to a child under the age
of fourteen."t9 A child will not be held liable in negligence regardless of

112. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 143; E.M. METERS, supra note 52, at 301.
113. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 83-84.
114. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 72 (emphasis in original).
115. See also G.H.A. SCHUT, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD 110 (1985), cited by C.C. VAN DAM, supra
note 1, at 84.
116. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 84.
117. HR 9 Dec. 1960, NJ 1963, 1 annot.; HR 9 Dec. 1966, NJ 1967, 69 annot.
118. See supra section II.E.1; art. 6:165 NBW.
119. Art. 6:164 NBW. The parents or guardians of a child who commits an unlawful act will
be held strictly liable, Art. 6:169 NBW. See infra section III.A.
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whether or not the child understood the act to be wrong. 20 Therefore,2 lack of
subjective fault will not relieve anyone from liability under the NBW.' '
One of the reasons Hartkamp takes the position that fault should be
understood in a subjective sense, which is so obviously at odds with the
adjudicatory reality, might be the ambiguity with which Meijers, the author of
the original draft, approached the choice between subjective and objective fault.
Even though, according to Meijers, negligence liability requires a "state of mind
of the actor" which renders the act "reprehensible,"t" this is generally an
objective test.'2 3 He then continues by pointing out that this objective test
does not replace the subjective test, but rather serves as an addition. "[When]
the understanding was present with the acting person ...

an inquiry into what

the normal person would have been aware of is not necessary."' 24 According
to Meijers' understanding, subjective fault is theprimary reason for attributing
the act to the actor, but objective fault suffices.'
Lack of subjective fault does not relieve anyone from liability. Subjective fault
can therefore not be considered a requirement for liability resulting from
wrongful conduct. However, it may still play a role in establishing liability.
Contrary to the common law, Netherlands tort law does not have a separate
doctrine of intentional torts. The distinction between "fault" and "intent" is
generally not considered relevant for imposing liability.'t 6 Yet a person is
obviously at fault when he or she intended to injure another or acted with
reckless disregard with respect to the risk of injuring another. 2 7 In those
situations subjective fault is likely to be relatively easy to prove. When
subjective fault is easy to prove, it will aid in establishing that the act was
contrary to the care due in society and therefore unlawful." 2 The important
Hoge Raad decision in Lindenbaurn v. Cohen' 29 is a prime example of a court
taking the subjective fault of the defendant into account in establishing that the
behavior was unlawful.' 30 Lindenbaum and Cohen were both in the publishing
business. Cohen had bribed Lindenbaum's servant to inform him about what
was going on at Lindenbaum's office, to provide him the names of Lindenbaum's
clients, and to supply Cohen with copies of Lindenbaum's offers to his clients.

120. A child will not be held liable for intentional torts either.
121. A possible exception was discussed, and discarded, see supra section II.C.
122. E.M. MEIJERS, supra note 52, at 300.
123. Id at 301. For a similar mix of subjective and objective tests, see W.J.SLAGTER,supra note
32, at 16, 18.
124. E.M. MEIJERS, supra note 52, at 302.
125. Similarly G.E. LANGEMELIER, supra note 33, at 32-33.
126. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 69-70. An exception is article 6:170 § 3 which will be
discussed in III.B.
127. Compare the common law "intentional torts." "[I]ntent... denote[s] that the actor desires
to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 8a.

128.
129.
130.

See also G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD,supra note 1, at 227.
HR 31 Jan. 1919, NJ 1919, 161.
See supra section II.C.
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Cohen, obviously, was trying to get an advantage over his competitor through
unfair means. The court of appeals, in accordance with earlier opinions of the
Hoge Raad, denied Lindenbaum's action for damages against Cohen because no
statute provided that Cohen's actions, including breaching the duty of confidentiality, were unlawful. The Hoge Raad then changed its former rigid opinion as
to the requirements for establishing unlawful behavior and held that unlawfulness does not require violation of a statute but can be established when behavior
"is contrary . . . to the carefulness which is due in society with regard to

another's person or property." 1 '
In summary, subjective fault is relevant for Netherlands tort liability. Yet the
legal scholars and the drafters of the NBW have misinterpreted the role
subjective fault plays. Subjective fault is not a separate requirement for liability.
It is "merely" a relevant factor in establishing unlawfulness.
3. Fault in the Objective Sense. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that

fault in a subjective sense is not required and that fault in the objective sense
suffices for attributing the act to the actor and establishing wrongful conduct.
There has been surprisingly little discussion on what exactly establishes fault as
distinguished from unlawfulness or carelessness. Pitlo writes that fault applies
when the actor can be "morally and psychologically reproached for his act."
According to Jansen, fault is the core of negligence liability which is established
both in "the case in which the actor knew that he was acting unlawfully and the
case in which the actor did not know, but .
should have known." t32 Again,
Van Dam has the most elaborate discussion on what qualifies the actor as
opposed to the act for liability. 133 Van Dam distinguishes two elements: (1)
possibility of knowledge; and (2) capability of avoidance. 13 Possibility of
knowledge refers to the chance that harm may result from certain conduct.
According to Van Dam, a person can only be required to take such care as to
prevent harm if it is possible for this person to be aware of a chance that harm
may result. 135 This does not require a precise awareness of the probability of
harm in a specific case. "It suffices that it is possible to know that certain
conduct creates a general risk, which can result in damage to another.""6
Capability of avoidance refers to the capability of the actor to prevent the
harm from occurring. A person cannot be considered to be careless for not
avoiding harm if such avoidance was not possible. This is not limited to his or

131. HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, 161, annot.; Weekblad 10365, annot; G.E. VAN MAANEN,
ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 155.
132. C.H.M. JANSEN, supra note 37, at 46 (emphasis in original).
133. Van Dam does not use the word "fault," but rather speaks of the carelessness of the actor
as opposed to the carelessness of the act. Thus, he includes both attribution due to fault and
attribution by virtue of the views current in society in his discussion.
134. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 133-42. Van Dam refers to HR 9 Dec. 1966, NJ 1967,
69 and Scholten's annotation distinguishing "knowledge and capability" as the requirements for
reproachability. See also W.J. SLAGTER, supra note 32, at 9, 15.
135. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 133.
136. Id at 134.
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her capability at the moment of the accident. Also relevant are the preventive
measures that could have been taken before the accident took place.'37
The elements of fault, as distinguished by Van Dam, can be translated into the
economic model for determining optimal care. "Possibility of knowledge" is the
actor's possible awareness of the probability of the harm and the extent of the
harm if harm were to occur. "Capability of avoidance" is the cost of care.
The elements which are taken into account to determine whether the actor was
at fault are the same as the elements which are taken into account to determine
whether the act was careless. Societal care was found to be a function of the
expected accident losses (the probability of harm multiplied by the extent of the
harm if harm were to occur) and the cost of care. 1
In order to attribute an unlawful act to its actor, fault in an objective sense
suffices. This means that courts will not inquire into the state of mind of the
actor at the time of the act, but rather will inquire into the knowledge of the
expected harm and the ability of a reasonably prudent person under similar
circumstances to avoid such harm. Since unlawfulness or carelessness of the act
are established by the same factors as fault of the actor, and since both require
an inquiry into what a person in general would know and be capable of,
unlawfulness and fault are really the same. Once unlawfulness is established,
fault can be established. 139 Therefore, it follows that fault in the objective
sense is not a separate requirement for liability from wrongful conduct.
4. Attribution by Virtue of a Statute. Attribution by virtue of a statute is a

completely separate matter from attribution due to fault of the actor or
attribution by virtue of the views current in society. Attribution by virtue of a
statute is not a requirement for liability, but rather a way to avoid establishing
either fault or the views current in society which would justify attributing the act
to the actor. The legislature has used this provision to address the problem of
whether someone acting under the influence of a mental or physical disorder can
be considered to have acted wrongfully. Under the BW, mental disorder excuses
a person from liability for an unlawful act when, due to the disorder, the actor
totally lacked awareness of the unlawful character of his or her behavior. 14 A
physical disorder generally does not excuse the actor. Someone who is, for
example, blind or deaf is required to take care in accordance with that
disability. 141 The Parliament chose to change these rules.142 Under the

137. Id at 135.
138. See supra section II.D.3.
139. Slagter acknowledges that this is the result of using an objective test. This leads him to
the conclusion that the test for "fault" is subjective. W.J. SLAGTER, supra note 32, at 10-11.
140.
HR 9 Dec. 1960, NJ 1963, 1, annot. More recently, denying anticipatory interpretation:
HR 18 Oct. 1985, NJ 1986, 226, annot., AA 1986, 213, annot., Kwartaalbericht NBW 1986, § 572,
annot. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 172, 179. For the common law, see W. PROSSER & P.
KEETON, supra note 33, at 1072-74.
141. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 79; H. SCHOORDIJK, supra note 78, at 364. For the
common law, see W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 33, at 175-78.
142. The Parliament did so in 1953, Vraag 16; PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 638.
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NBW, the fact that a person who causes injury has a physical or mental disorder
does not prevent the attribution of the act to him or her. 143 During the
parliamentary debate, Meijers explained the choice as follows:
It is... not a matter of moral liability, but a matter of compensation.
If a person, even a mentally disturbed, with sufficient assets, causes
damage to another, who is aware of nothing, than it is a fair principle
that, if not the person, at least his assets are liable for the damage
caused.144
There are two corrective provisions to this harsh rule. A third party may have
a duty to supervise the actor. Insofar as breach of this duty constitutes an
unlawful act against the victim, 14s both the actor and the supervisor will be
liable for the injury."4 Contrary to the ordinary rules of contribution,147 the
supervisor will have to carry the burden alone, at least to the extent of his or her
liability. 148 The second correction is the new general power of mitigation of
damages that the courts have under the NBW. t4 9 One of the circumstances for
which this general power is explicitly intended includes liability for acts
committed under the influence of a mental or physical disorder. Whether a third
party is liable next to the actor may be relevant for courts in exercising this
power. 150
In summary, attribution by virtue of a statute is used to instruct courts to
disregard any possible mental or physical disturbances in establishing whether an
unlawful act was committed. Under the BW, courts may sometimes relieve a
mentally disturbed tortfeasor from liability because he or she could not be held
at fault. Under the NBW, mental disturbances will not relieve anyone from
liability. The mentally or physically disturbed tortfeasor has a right to
indemnification if, and to the extent that, his or her supervisor's carelessness also
caused the unlawful act.
5. Attribution by Virtue of the Views Current in Society. The last ground for

143. Art. 6:165 NBW. Contrary to the general tort provision, article 6:165 only attributes
unlawful acts to mentally and physically disturbed persons. In this situation, an omission to act
cannot establish unlawful behavior. A deaf person who does not hear a cry for help from someone
who is drowning will therefore not be held liable. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 79. C.C. VAN
DAM, supra note 1, at 177.

144.

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY,

supra note 4, at 641-42.

145. Based on art. 6:162 NBW. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 82.
146. This may be the legal guardian or a hospital: "Occupational therapy is brilliant, but one
always needs to consider that the necessary measures to protect the safety of third parties have to be
taken. Failure to do so will be a ground for ... liability." PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, spra note 4,
at 642.
147. Ordinarily the contribution among defendants, who are held jointly and severally liable, is
based on their comparative negligence; arts. 6:101 & 102 NBW.
148. Art. 6:165 § 2 NBW; PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 661.
149. Art. 6:109 NBW.

150.

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY,

supra note 4, at 642.
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attribution is attribution by virtue of the views current in society. This catch-all
provision is designed to impose liability where fault cannot be found and where

no statute provides for attribution. Authors who interpret the requirement of
fault in a subjective sense understand fault in an objective sense as attribution
by virtue of the views current in society.151 Authors who interpret fault in an
objective sense understand that the views current in society allow the court to

attribute an act to its actor without, or regardless of, fault5sz In either case,
no situation can be imagined where the act would be considered unlawful but
would not be attributed to the actor for lack of the views current in society since
once unlawfulness of the act is established, fault, too, can be established.
6 Attributionand the Standardof Care. The drafters of the NBW intended to

codify two requirements for liability resulting from wrongful conduct: (1) the act
must be wrong (unlawful); and (2) the actor must be wrong (fault). Because
"fault" was found as too limited a ground for liability, the drafters expanded the
qualification of the actor by using "attribution" instead. 5 3 As will be discussed

in this section, this was not the appropriate response to the problems with fault
as a second requirement for liability.
Originally, during the first eighty years after the BW was introduced, the
elements of "unlawfulness" and "fault" in article 1401 BW were not as clearly

distinguished. 154 Both elements referred to wrongful conduct as a whole.
According to Van Maanen, who did an extensive study of the development of

negligence liability, no real indication can be found that "fault" was read to refer
to the actor as distinguished from the act, or requiring that the actor could be

reproached for committing the unlawful act.155 "In as far as specific reproachability was being required it can be interpreted as a closer, more refined testing
of the behavior in a specific case." 156
Van Maanen's analysis leads to the conclusion that liability without the actor
being at fault, in the sense of worthy of reproach, is not a novelty. Requiring

See cite in II.E.2 from A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 72.
See, e.g., G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 225-26. According
to the annotators of HR 26 Sept. 1986, NJ 1987, 253, annot., AA 1987, 164, annot., the Hoge Raad
takes this approach too. See also C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 83.
153. The commonly held understanding is that the NBW has expanded liability for wrongful
conduct by allowing for such liability without "fault" on the side of the actor and that such expansion
is required by "modem times" with increased technology etcetera. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 618. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 21. Schut, Schuld en Risico, WEEKBLAD VOOR HET
PRIVAATRECHT, NOTRARIAAT EN REGISTRATIE, No. 5045, 1969, at 270; W.J. SLAGTER, supra note 32,
at 1-2.
154. According to Van Maanen, during the period between 1838 and 1919, the distinction
between the two was not considered important and "was messed around with." G.E. VAN MAANEN,
ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 104. Article 1401 BW was, as most of the Netherlands Civil
Code, a translation of the French Code Civil. However, article 1382 of the Code Civil does not
contain the word "unlawful."
155. G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD, supra note 1, at 71, 104, 195.
156. Id at 116. According to Van Maanen, "fault" generally referred to wrongful conduct.
Fault may have also been read to require that the actor had the mental capacity to understand the
wrongfulness of the act in order to hold him or her liable. Id at 71, 104.
151.

152.
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fault of the actor (or attribution of the act to the actor) to be established
separately from the unlawfulness of the act is a new development." 7
The preceding sections have shown this development to be unsuccessful.
"Fault" or "attribution" is not a separate requirement for liability under
Netherlands negligence law. Once it is established that the act violated due care
and is thus unlawful, the actor will be liable for the wrongful conduct.
Fault in a subjective sense is not required. An inquiry into the state of mind
of the actor will not relieve the actor from liability, except in a limited number
of cases under the BW. Fault in an objective sense is already established by
establishing that the actor violated due care. No separate inquiry into a person's
general state of mind can relieve the actor of liability. In so far as such inquiry
is relevant, it can be made to establish whether the act violated due care.
Therefore, even if courts were to interpret fault only in the limited subjective
sense, they would always find that the views current in society would attribute
the act to the actor because the actor would be held at fault under an objective
standard. Finally, attribution by virtue of a statute is, by its nature, not a
separate requirement.
Contrary to the way the BW is interpreted and the way the NBW is set out,
the conclusion must be that Netherlands negligence liability does not have two
requirements. Liability for wrongful conduct is liability for actions contrary to
the care due in society. Rather than expanding the grounds which qualify the
actor as opposed to the act, the drafters should have abolished the two-step
analysis of wrongful conduct.
This is not to say that "fault" or "attribution" are not mentioned in court
opinions-they are. 5 8 But any considerations made with respect to fault of the
actor could, and therefore should, have been made with respect to the

unlawfulness or carelessness of the act. 59 Splitting up wrongful conduct into
two separate elements unnecessarily complicates the analysis of Netherlands
negligence liability.
Fault or attribution is not a separate requirement for liability. Yet the
considerations made with respect to fault or attribution, both by courts and legal
scholars, do serve a function. They modify or refine the assessment of due care
to match the specific circumstances of the case, or rather of the defendant at
hand. 60 The different grounds for attribution serve as instructions to the court
157. Also, J.M. VAN DUNNE, VERBINTENISSENRECHT IN ONTWIKKELING 244-47 (1985); and J.C.
VAN OVEN, ONRECHTMATIGHEID EN SCHULD 3278-80 (1932).
158. See, e.g., HR 22 June 1979 NJ 1979, 535 annot., VR 1979 83 (liability for damage caused
by dangerous object requires both fault and unlawfulness); HR 26 Sept. 1986, NJ 1987, 253, annot.,
AA 1987, 164, annot. (the fault of the government is, in principle, established by committing an
unlawful act); HR 26 Jan. 1990, nr. 13858, RvdW 1990, 38 (the government is at fault because it
should have taken into account the possibility that its unlawful behavior lacked a ground for
justification).
159. J.M. VAN DUNNt, supra note 157, at 243,247; G.E. VAN MAANEN, ONRECHTMATnGE DAAD,
supra note 1, at 226-27. Van Maanen proposes to discard article 6:162 § 3, G.E. VAN MAANEN,
ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD,supra note 1, at 228-30. See also C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 184.
160. Compare Van Maanen's comments on the interpretation of fault in the period 1838-1919,
cited above. See also C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 183-5.
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concerning which personal circumstances of the defendant it must take into
consideration and which personal circumstances it may or must disregard in
determining whether the defendant violated due care.
The court must disregard a defendant's mental or physical disorder in
establishing whether the act that caused injury was contrary to societal care. 6'
The court may disregard any other personal circumstance, but the court may not
disregard the defendant's subjective fault. 162 The defendant must be held liable
if it is clear to the court that the defendant committed the unlawful act
intentionally or with reckless disregard of the harm that was substantially certain
to occur.

F. Economic Analysis of Wrongful Conduct
The preceding sections show that under Netherlands law, liability for wrongful
conduct or negligence is liability for acting contrary to the care due in society.
The Netherlands standard of care was found to be consistent with the economic
model of optimal care. 63 This section applies economic analysis to the
standard of care modified by the instructions given to the court about which
personal circumstances of the defendant it may or may not take into account.
First, the objective standard of care will be discussed. Second, the fact that,
under the NBW, courts must disregard mental and physical disorders in
establishing due care will be examined. Finally, the fact that courts may not
ignore subjective fault in assessing whether due care was taken, when it is
sufficiently obvious to come to its attention, will be addressed.
1. Objective Standardof Care. According to economic analysis, optimal care
is a function of the cost and the benefits of an individual's activities in society.
If perfect information on each individual's costs and benefits were available, that
would be the standard courts would use.'6 However, it is generally costly, if
not impossible, to acquire such information. Rather than not holding an actor
liable, which would result in underdeterrence, courts use a general or objective
standard of care to determine liability to save administrative costs.
Aside from saving administrative costs, economic analysis distinguishes another
policy objective which an objective standard of care might serve. Courts
generally have difficulty including in the standard of care the utility people derive
from participating in various activities. Even if they can, they also have difficulty
in assessing the actual level of participation in activities when determining
whether the actor participated optimally.'6 By requiring a level of care that
is above the individual or even the average level of care, courts induce
161.
162.
163.
164.

Art. 6:162 § 3 seen in connection with 6:165 NBW.
Art. 6:162 § 3 NBW.
See supra section II.D.3.
W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 123-26; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 73-

165.

See supra section I.D.

74.
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participants to take the utility they will derive from participating in the activity
into account in deciding what level of care to take. 16 People
who cannot live
16
up to this standard are, in effect, subject to strict liability.
Under Netherlands negligence law, an objective standard of care suffices for
imposing liability. The explanation provided by economic analysis, that the use
of such a standard is a way of diminishing administrative costs while preventing
underdeterrence, seems very plausible. The following two examples illustrate
that requiring a high standard of care is used in Netherlands negligence liability
as a way to induce people to take into account the utility they derive from
participating in activities which impose high costs on society.
Driving a car imposes high costs on society. The standard of care applied by
Netherlands courts for people who decide to participate in this activity is the
standard of the "perfect driver."'6 The driver of a car cannot make any
mistakes, not even in a very critical situation. In one case, a deer suddenly
jumped out on the road in front of a car and the driver reacted by swerving over
to the left lane. Unfortunately another car was driving on that side of the road.
A fatal collision resulted. The Hoge Raad held the driver of the first car liable
because he could have swerved over to the right and thus avoided the accident.' 69
Another example of the use of a higher than average standard of care is found
in the recent explosion of pollution liability cases. Polluters are held liable in
tort for the clean up cost imposed on the government when the pollution
imposes a serious threat to the population or to the environment. 7 The trend

in these cases seems to be an application of a very high standard of care.' 7 ' If
a substance brought into the soil is poisonous, or damaging in some other way,
the responsible person or organization tends to be held liable for the cost of
cleaning up, regardless of whether the polluter knew that the substance was

dangerous."
Both cases exemplify situations in which the activity engaged in is likely to

impose high costs on society even if an actor takes the necessary level of care.
By requiring a standard of care which, for most participants, effectively comes
down to strict liability, society induces the participants to take into account the
full extent of the cost of these activities. This will influence the participation in

166. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 126-27.
167. Id at 128. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 75.
168. C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 151.
169. HR 11 Nov. 1983, NJ 1984, 331, BR 1984, 56, annot., Kwartaalbericht NBW, 1984, 50
annot.
170. Based on Art. 21 Interimwet BodemSanering and Art. 1401 BW.
171. The Hoge Raad has not yet given an opinion on the standard of care. HR 9 Feb. 1990,
RvdW 1990, 51 and HR 14 Apr. 1989 RvdW 1989, Milieu & Recht, 1989, 6 seem to support this
trend.
172. See, e.g., Rb's-Gravenhage, 19 Oct. 1988, BR 1989,131; Rb Rotterdam 9 Oct. 1987, TMA,
98 annot.; Van Dunne, TMA 1987, at 87 speaks of a "pseudo-risk-liability." See also Wubs, Het Civiele
Recht: Wapen van de Overheid bij de Bescherming van het Milieu, TUDSCHRIEr VOOR MILIEU
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID 93-99 (1988).
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these activities
in a way that is, according to economic analysis, socially
73
desirable.

2. Mental and Physical Disorders. Under the BW, those people who lack all
awareness of the unlawfulness of their behavior cannot be held liable. Under the
NBW, the court must disregard the fact that the defendant suffered from a
mental disorder in establishing whether the act was unlawful. The standard of
care is therefore always that of a sane person. From the perspective of
deterrence, the BW approach seems to make more sense. As far as people are
open to deterrence through the tort system, they will be held liable according to
general standard of care. Those people who cannot be deterred, because they
"lack all awareness" of the unlawfulness of their behavior, should not be held
liable since this will not reduce the number of torts committed by them.' 74
Shifting the loss from the victim to the tortfeasor does not appear to be efficient.
The NBW's abolishment of this defense may be defended by a different
economic argument. The defense of "lack of all awareness" requires an inquiry
into the defendant's state of mind. The fact that the lower courts are divided as
to what exactly establishes total lack of awareness 75 supports the impression
that this inquiry is not an easy one. The cost of this inquiry is avoided by
disregarding the individual's mental disorder in all cases.' 7 Which regime is
the most efficient is not immediately clear. It depends on the administrative
costs incurred in holding mentally incompetent persons liable and in distinguishing who qualifies as mentally incompetent for the sake of negligence liability.
The parliamentary history does not refer to administrative costs as a reason for
disregarding all mental disorders in the standard of due care. It refers to
fairness. In those situations where the tortfeasor has sufficient assets
to
7
compensate the victim, it is considered unfair if the loss is not shifted.'
This fairness consideration can be supported by economic analysis. If the actor
lacks awareness of the unlawfulness of his or her act and the threat of liability,
he or she probably also lacks awareness of the risk. Compared to the victim, the
actor is then less risk averse. Social welfare increases when the risk is shifted
from people who are more risk averse to people who are less risk averse or risk
neutral.1 78 Under these conditions, holding mentally disturbed tortfeasors
173. The fact that most drivers will be insured for this kind of liability does not frustrate this
analysis. When a person is considering whether to engage in an activity, he or she will weigh the
added insurance premium against the added utility he or she would derive from the act, instead of
weighing the added expected accident losses against the added utility. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9,
at 186-245 on the effect of insurance on accident law.
174. See also Scholten who wrote that "the law poses norms, prohibits violating them, and in
doing so can only be aimed at and is only aimed at those who can be expected to conduct themselves
according to certain norms. It is foolish to speak of duty to someone for whom duties are
unthinkable ....Finally, one forgets that liability law also has to work as a deterrent." P. SCHOLTEN,
VERZAMELDE GESCHRIFTEN, DEEL

175.
176.
177.
178.

IV 171-72 (1954).

C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1 and the court opinions cited there.
W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 128.
See cite in II.E.4.
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9,at 190.
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liable instead of leaving the loss with the victims would increase social welfare.
Deterrence can explain the liability of the supervisor of the mentally disturbed
tortfeasor. If a mentally disturbed person lacks awareness of what constitutes
unlawful behavior, it is the supervisor's responsibility to prevent such person
from causing injury. Contrary to the liability of parents for the careless acts of
their children, 179 the supervisor's liability is explicitly limited to the liability for
his or her own wrongful conduct and is therefore not strict liability.18 The fact
that the mentally disturbed committed a tort does not automatically
mean that
81
the supervisor was careless. That has to be proven separately.
This can be explained using economic analysis. Strict liability imposes the full
cost of the activities of the mentally disturbed person on the supervisor.
Generally, strict liability will limit the activity of the liable person. A person will
only engage in an activity if the (added) utility of the activity outweighs the
(added) costs imposed by that activity. Therefore, the cost imposed on society
will be optimal. However, if a potential supervisor decides not to assume the
responsibility for one or more mentally disturbed persons because of potential
liability for behavior beyond the control of the supervisor, there will be less
supervisors overall and the number of torts is likely to increase rather than
decrease. Contrary to the situation with children, the number of mentally
disturbed in the world is independent from the decision of people to assume
responsibility for them. Therefore, strict liability would be inefficient in these
situations.
The supervisor has no right to indemnification against the actor. This is also
in accordance with the economic model. The supervisor is held responsible for
torts committed by an actor who lacks awareness of the norms. Personal liability
will not have a deterrent effect on this person. Indemnification of the supervisor
from the actor would therefore serve no allocative benefits and would cause
inefficient administrative costs.
Under the NBW, courts also disregard physical disorders. This can be
understood from the economic perspective to the extent that the actor can
prevent accidents due to his or her physical disorder. For example, a blind
82
person can carry a cane to avoid walking into things and also to alert others
But according to the parliamentary history, in establishing due care the intention
is also to disregard unexpected physical disorders, such as a heart attack without
warning.'s 3 These accidents cannot be deterred. Under an economic analysis,
administrative costs might again support this rule."
But in this case, the

179.
180.
181.
182.

See infra section III.A.
HR 9 Dec. 1960, NJ 1963, 2 annot.
A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 82; H. SCHOORDUK, supra note 78, at 372.
For an economic analysis of the different common law rules, see W.M. LANDES & R.A.

POSNER, supra note 13, at 127.

183. As an example, the parliamentary history presents the situation in which someone, due to
a physical shortcoming, suddenly loses consciousness while crossing the street, and thereby causes an
accident, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 661.
184.

But see W.M. LANDES & W.M. POSNER, supra note 13, at 130.
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fairness considerations of the drafters for this rule do not have an economic
analysis substitute. There is no reason to expect that the tortfeasor would be
less risk averse than the victim. 85
Whether the rules instructing courts to disregard mental and physical disorders
in establishing the on the way courts handle their general power of mitigating
damages.'86 This mitigation power is limited to situations in which the
consequences of tull liability would "obviously be unacceptable." In the
parliamentary history, the liability for harm caused under the influence of a
physical or mental disorder is the first example of situations in which mitigation
of liability may be called for. 8 7 The sole reason that the act was committed
under influence of such a disorder does not suffice for mitigation of the liability,
but "when the liability of the [mentally or physically disturbed] actor is not
covered by insurance and the actor does not have much assets it may be
unacceptable that he has to bear the full burden of the liability."'85 If the
courts use this mitigation power to bring the test of someone's mental or
physical capacities back into the question of liability, the savings in administrative costs will be substantially less.
In summary, the NBW rules of liability for mentally and physically disturbed
are potentially efficient because of the savings in administrative costs. These
savings may offset the inefficient effects of these rules which hold those
tortfeasors liable who cannot be deterred. With respect to mentally disturbed
persons, the potential efficiency of these rules is supported by the fact that
shifting the loss to the mentally disturbed tortfeasor is generally socially
beneficial because such a tortfeasor is likely to be risk neutral, or at least less
risk averse than the victim. The rules of liability for people with a physical
disorder are not supported by a similar consideration.
3. Subjective Fault. Subjective fault implies that the actor was aware of the
potential harm of his or her act and could have easily refrained from the act. It
is not necessary to establish subjective fault in order to hold someone liable for
an unlawful act. Therefore, subjective fault will only be brought to the court's
attention in those cases where it is obvious. It may become obvious from the
defendant's statements (e.g., "I wanted to hurt him because I didn't like his
face,") from witnesses (e.g., "He told me he wanted to hurt him because he didn't
like his face,") or from circumstantial evidence (e.g., the defendant drove 60 miles
per hour through a densely populated area for no apparent reason). The court
cannot disregard these circumstances when brought to its attention. If someone

185. As far as supervisors are held liable for failing to prevent the tort, the same explanation
holds true for supervisors of the mentally disturbed.
186. Art. 6:109 NBW.
187. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 449, 624. One of the reasons the Hoge Raad
has not interpreted the liability of mentally disturbed in the BW in anticipation of the NBW, is
probably the connection between this type of liability and this new mitigation power. A.M.J. VAN
BUCHEM-SPAPENS, supra note 5, at 44; C.C. VAN DAM, supra note 1, at 179.
188. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 449.
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intends to harm another, or acts with reckless disregard of the harm that is
almost certain to result, he or she should bear the burden of the resulting harm
and consequently compensate the victim.189
Economic analysis can support this moral conception. The intent to cause
harm will substantially raise the probability of harm. The benefit or utility of the
act may be high to the actor but is socially not recognized as valid. For example,
a soccer supporter might derive intense pleasure from injuring a supporter for
the opposing team, but this is not considered to contribute to the welfare of
society. 19° The socially recognized utility of the act is zero and the cost of not
engaging in the act (cost of taking care) is also zero. It is therefore socially
optimal if the actor refrains from the act. The liability rules should be aimed at
inducing the actor to refrain from these acts.
Not all intentionally inflicted injuries create inefficient costs. If someone acts
in self-defense, the probability of harm may be great but the cost of refraining
from the act is high because it includes the injury that the actor would otherwise
suffer. 91 Such an act should not be, and is not, considered unlawful.
G. Summary

Netherlands negligence liability is based on a violation of the standard of care.
The legal standard is comparable to the economic standard of care. Many
aspects of the way the standard of care is assessed are consistent with economic
analysis. Both are based on the expected accident losses in relation to the cost
of care to prevent such losses. In assessing the appropriate care, courts generally
use an objective standard. The economic advantage of that choice is that it saves
administrative costs. This objective standard may actually be above average level
of care. This will induce people who tend to expose society to high costs to take
the utility of their activities into account when deciding whether to participate.
Under the NBW, courts have to use the standard of care of a sane and ablebodied person. They cannot take into account that the actor may have acted
under the influence of a mental or physical disorder. The main economic
advantage of this instruction is its potential to save administrative costs. Finally,
courts must take into account that the actor might have intentionally caused the
injury. This is economically understandable because the injury in these cases
tends to be substantial while both utility and cost of preventing the accident are
mostly absent.
Il1.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

This section discusses liability for the wrongful or negligent conduct of
189. Punitive damages are not awarded under Netherlands tort law. Damages may be higher
in case of an intentional tort through the rules of causation and damage assessment. A.S. HARTKAMP,
supra note 46, at 69.
190. See generally S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 146-47.
191. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 152.
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another, so called imputed negligence or vicarious liability. It focuses on two
important areas of vicarious liability under Netherlands law: (1) the liability of
parents for the wrongful conduct of their children; and
192 (2) the liability of
employers for the wrongful conduct of their employees.
A. Parents

Under the BW, both the parents and the child may be held liable for a tort
committed by the child.193 Parents or guardians are held liable for the torts of

their children under a rebuttable presumption of negligent supervision.' 94
Under the NBW, a child under the age of fourteen cannot be held liable for

negligence. The wording of the applicable clause is rather cryptic; it states that
"[a]n act195 of a child that has not reached the age of fourteen cannot be
attributed to it as an unlawful act." t 96 It seems to imply that a child under the

age of fourteen cannot commit an unlawful act. 197 Yet parents or guardians
are held unconditionally liable for the injuries caused by an act of such a child

which "could be attributed to it as an unlawful act but for its age."'" Therefore, these clauses are generally construed to mean that a child can commit an
199 The child will commit an
unlawful act but cannot be held liable for it.
unlawful act when it violates the general standard of care applicable to adults.

This can be interpreted to mean that the child's age and accompanying
perceptions are to be disregarded in establishing due care."° With respect to
children between the age of fourteen and sixteen, the BW regime applies.
Parents are liable for the unlawful acts attributable to those
20 1 children under a
rebuttable presumption of fault on the part of the parents.

192. The NBW has two more clauses providing for vicarious liability in the general chapter on
torts. A principal is liable for the torts committed by an independent contractor, and for torts
committed by his or her representative with power of attorney, in as far as such torts were committed
within the tasks assigned (article 6:171, and article 6:172 NBW especially). Economic analysis of
these provisions would be comparable to the analysis of the vicarious liability for employees.
193. When a child lacks "all awareness" of the wrongfulness of his or her behavior, they will not
be held liable. See supra section II.E.2. For the common law, see W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra
note 33, at 1071.
194. Art. 1403 BW; HR 26 Nov. 1948, NJ 1949, 149; HR 18 Oct. 1985, NJ 1986, 226, annot.,
AA 1986, 213, annot., Kwartaalbericht NBW, 1986, 64, annot.; A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 121;

H.

SCHOORDIJA,

supra note 78, at 373.

195. Liability for torts committed by children is explicitly limited to unlawful acts. Omissions
are excluded. See also HR 22 Nov. 1974, NJ 1975, 149, annot.
196. Art. 6:164 NBW (emphasis added).
197. See Van Maanen, Aansprakelijkheid van Ouders voor kinderen in het NBW, NJB 1981, at
365-66 [hereinafter Van Maanen, Aansprakelijkheid]; F.T. OLDENHUIS, ONRECHMATIGE DAAD:
AANSPRAKELUJKHEID VOOR PEFSONEN 9 (Monografieen NBW B-46, 1985).
198. Art. 6:169 NBW.
199. Van Maanen, Aansprakelijkheid, supra note 197, at 368-69. See also G.E. VAN MAANEN,
ONRECHTMAT1GE DAAD,supra note 1, at 203-04. Van Maanen points out that the wording of this
article is contrary to the drafters' choice to distinguish between the carelessness of the act and the
carelessness of the actor. But see A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 81, 113.
200. A.S. HARTKAMP,supra note 46, at 120,123; F.T. OLDENHUIS,supra note 197, at 8-11, 16-17.
201. Art. 6:169 § 2 NBW; F.T. OLDENHUIS, supra note 197, at 9.
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Under the BW, the victim of an injury caused by a child often finds no
recovery. 2 This was experienced as unsatisfactory by victims as well as by
parents. Parents often felt morally obliged to compensate the victim, yet had no
legal obligation to do so and therefore no claim accrued on their liability
insurer.2 3 The Netherlands Association of Liability Insurers remedied this
situation. They included in their standard policy coverage for both intentionally
and negligently committed torts by children.
The impact of these insurance
policies is extensive since approximately eighty-five percent of the households in
the Netherlands carry liability insurance. 20 5
According to the parliamentary history, the justification to hold parents or
guardians strictly liable is that:
on the one hand authority and control by the legal representative [of
the child] can be regarded in general to be of direct influence on the
conduct of the child and yet on the other hand reasonable control
goes accompanied with the necessity to leave the child a certain
freedom, which implies that risks are necessarily taken, of which, in
principle, third parties should not become a victim. 206
The insurance practice is also named as an important consideration for holding
parents strictly liable.207 The parliamentary history also refers to the advantage
that risk-liability will abolish the difficult evidentiary questions that negligence
liability, both of the child and the parents, causes.208
Strict liability of the parents for the wrongful conduct of their children is a
form of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is, according to economic analysis,
a remedy when tort liability provides insufficient deterrence for the actor because
he or she lacks sufficient assets. 2°9 Vicarious liability holds someone other
than the actor liable; someone who can observe the level of care of the actor and
control it. The better the second party's ability is to control the actor's behavior,
the better this substitute for tort liability will work.210

202. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 119; Van Maanen,Aansprakeijkhei, supra note 197, at
364.
203. See H. SCHOORDuI, supra note 78, at 370-71.
204. Aantjes-Cozijnse & Klosse,AVP en NBW: De Verzekeringspraktijken deAansprakelijkheidsregeling voor Minde'arigen, NJB at 1140 (1985).
205. Id at 1141. In 1974, at the time of the drafting of this part of the NBW, approximately
80% of the households insured for liability. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679. Compare
these figures with West Germany 60%, Belgium 55% and France 60-65% cited by F.T. OLDENHUIS,
supra note 197, at 7.
206. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 678.
207. Id. at 656. According to the parliamentary history, "insurance of risk liability will as a rule
be available and indicated for the parent." PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679; also F.T.
OLDENHUIS, supra note 197, at 9.
208. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 656, 679.
209. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 170-72.
210. W.M. LANDERS & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 121; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 171.
See infra section III.B. for a more detailed discussion.
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It can certainly be argued that, generally, children lack sufficient assets to be
deterred from inefficient behavior by tort liability. More importantly, however,
is that children generally lack the awareness of norms to receive optimal
incentives from tort liability. Parents are in a position to remedy this because
they can exercise control over the child's conduct. 2" To the extent that the
parents can exercise control over the child's activities, vicarious liability may
provide incentives to assure that the child takes optimal care.212 For example,
a parent will take into account the full cost of liability in deciding whether to
allow a child to ride a bike to school, to play in the street, or to play with a
B.B.-gun. Yet, parents are only to a limited extent able to control the conduct
of their child. Part of growing up is finding out when to obey and when not to
obey instructions. The parliamentary history acknowledges this."1 3 Parents
cannot fully control a child's behavior. To the extent that they cannot do so, the
liability for a child's unlawful acts is strict liability. The advantage of strict
liability is that the liable person will measure the full costs of accidents imposed
on society by his or her participation in an activity against the utility he or she
will derive from the activity. Landes and Posner recognize the limitations of
influencing behavior through tort liability in this situation: "[I]t is unlikely that
imposing liability on parents would significantly affect people's choice of whom
to marry or how many children to have; in other words, activity level adjustments
2 14
do not seem to be a promising method of reducing torts by children."
Surprisingly, the drafters of the NBW do not agree. Imposing strict liability
on parents is in accordance with their responsibility for bringing a child into
society. Parents not only have the duty to raise the child and care for it, they
also have the duty to bear the cost of doing so, especially "in a society in which,
as is increasingly the case, it was the parents' own decision whether and how
many children they wanted. "2 5
Another economic explanation of the choice of liability rules mentioned by the
drafters 21 6 regarding children and their parents is saving administrative costs.
The fault based rules of the BW require two different and complicated inquiries.
Both the level of care taken by the child and the level of care taken by the
parents need to be examined. Under the NBW, the costs of these inquiries will

211. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 118; H. SCHOORDIJE, supra note 78, at 369-70.
212. Langemeijer writes that "[hie who ... chooses, in a matter of speaking, to occupy a wider
space in society than that of his person alone ... [e.g., employers, parents] ... may be required to
have the awareness that this implies risk to his fellow men .... [He has] the duty to do anything
within his power to reduce these risks. [This duty] does not guarantee that harm will not occur, [but]
it reduces the chance that harm will occur." G.E. LANGEMEIJER, supra note 33, at 73 (emphasis in
original).
213. See cites above and PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 656.
214. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 121. Contrary to employers, parents lack
the possibility of termination of the relationship. Sending the child to a boarding school will not
relieve the parents of their liability.
215. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679. The drafters acknowledge that this is
different for guardians who are not the child's natural parent. This situation is comparable with the
argument against strict liability for supervisors of mental patients. See supra section II.F.2.
216.

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679.
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be reduced. Children will be held to the general standard of an adult. Liability
is imposed on parents without any inquiry into their care. Both these changes
will tend to raise the number of claims with respect to harm caused by children.
The attitude of the insurance companies can be taken as an indication that, in
this case, the savings in administrative costs
caused by simplifying the liability
2 7
regime outweigh the costs of extra claims. "
This situation is probably different for children between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen. The drafters explicitly mention parents' lack of control over this age
group as a reason for not holding parents vicariously liable. "Parents or
guardians are ... generally not in the position to preclude children of this age

from certain activities, and often cannot be required.., to take measures which
would render such activities in general impossible."21 8 Holding parents strictly
liable for the torts of this age group may raise the number of claims without
beneficial effects on the number of torts committed.
In summary, Netherlands liability rules holding parents strictly liable for the

negligent acts committed by children less than fourteen years of age are
supported by economic analysis. Where parents are able to control the behavior
of their children, vicarious liability will. provide incentives for parents to assure
that children take due care. Where this is not the case, strict liability will give
the parents incentives to consider whether they want children in the first place.
Finally, the liability rules for children and their parents save administrative costs.
Whether parents actually need the threat of liability to be induced to assure that
their children take optimal care, and whether or not potential liability rules will
influence parents' decision on how many children to have, does not need to be
answered here. There is no reason here to, as Landes and Posner do, deviate
from the general assumption of economic analysis that behavior is controlled by
a cost-benefit analysis.219 For this study, it is relevant that the rules for liability
and the considerations for imposing this form of liability, as expressed by the
drafters of the NBW, are consistent with economic analysis.
B. Employers
When an employee, in the course of his or her employment, " causes injury
2
by taking insufficient care, both the employer and the employee are liable. 1
Under the BW, employers are held liable under an unrebuttable presumption of

217. Aantjes-Cozijnse & Klosse, supra note 204, at 1142. Aantjes-Cozijnse and Klosse expect
that the NBW premiums for liability for children will rise contrary to the expectations expressed by
the government in the parliamentary discussion.

218.

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY,

supra note 4, at 680.

219. Their position may be influenced by the fact that the common law does not hold parents
vicariously liable for their children's torts.
220. The literal text of article 6:170 NBW is more complicated than this. This description
suffices. Compare F.T. OLDENHUIS, supra note 197, at 42-43, 63-66.
221. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 114-15; F.T. OLDENHUIS, supra note 197, at 68-69.
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fault. 2 2 Under the NBW, employers are held strictly liable for their employees' torts.m In effect, both regimes are the same. The employee is liable
based on the general tort provisions.2Y4
The employee who pays the damages has a right of indemnification against the
employer. The employer has no right to indemnification against the employee,
except when the harm was intentionally caused by the employee, or where the
employee acted with "conscious recklessness" or when "the circumstances of the
case indicate differently."m
No consensus exists on the reason or justification for holding employers
vicariously liable.Y In Sweegers v. Van de Hout, the Hoge Raad justified these
general rules as a protection of employees based on the experience that
employees, working daily with machines and tools, are easily tempted to not
always take the required safety measures.2 7 The Hoge Raad also identified
protection of the victim as a reason for holding the employer vicariously
liablezs According to Hartkamp, the rule of vicarious liability stems to a large
extent from the desire to provide the victim with a solvent debtor. To enhance
his point, he recites the fact that sixty-five percent of the businesses in the
Netherlands are insured for liability claims. His impression is "that because of
fairness considerations and in the interest of the community, the interests of the
employer are made subservient to the interests of the injured. " 229
Economic analysis identifies as the primary reason for vicarious liability of the
employer, that it will provide better incentives for the employee to take care
than personal liability is apt to do.' 3 This idea is based on the assumption
that the employee lacks sufficient assets to pay a tort judgment. Optimal
deterrence is frustrated when the tortfeasor's assets are less than the loss he or
she may cause.23' By holding the employer liable for the employee's torts, the

222. Art. 1403 BW; HR 7 Mar. 1919, Weekblad 10423, NJ 1919, 434; HR 10 June 1955, 552,
annot., AA, 145, annot.; A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 132.
223. Art. 6:170 NBW.
224. Art. 1401 BW and Art. 6:162 NBW.
225. Art. 6:170 § 3 NBW.
226. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 132-33; F.T. OLDENHUIS, supra note 197, at 96;
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 711. Meijers refers, among others, to the common law
experience with vicarious liability. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 711-12.
227. HR 9 Jan. 1987, NJ 1987, 948, annot., AA 1987, 477, annot., Kwartaalbericht Nieuw BW
1988/1 31, annot. The Hoge Raad refers to Article 170 § 3 NBW to illustrate the general rule that
employees are only required to carry (part of) the burden of liability for damage caused on the job,
either to the employer, a third party or to the employee him or herself, when the employee was at
"gross fault."
228. HR 7 Jan. 1983, NJ 1984, 607, annot.
229. A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 133.
230. See supra section III.A.
231. This can be demonstrated as follows:
Care

Cost

Probability

care
no care

5
0

15%
25%

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

Expected
Accident Losses
15
25

Expected Liability
(assets=20)
0
5

35

California
Western International
Law Journal, Vol.LAW
21, No.
2 [1991], Art.[Vol.
3
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
21

employer will have an incentive to insure that the employee takes due care or
else to fire the employee. Whether, and to what extent, vicarious liability will
provide the right incentive depends on the extent to which the employer can
exercise control over the employee.232
Under Netherlands law, vicarious liability of the employer is for accidents
caused by employees in the course of their employment, and is thus based on the
control the employer can exercise over the employees' conduct.2 3 Indeed,
"[the] limitation of the liability of the employee for afflicted damage leaves
unaffected the possibility to impose on him because of his conduct other
Furthermore, the
sanctions such as disciplinary measures and discharge."2
employee does have to contribute to the liability payments when the injury was
the result of his or her intent or conscious recklessness, unless the employer
encouraged or ordered the reckless act of the employee. 235 This is consistent
with economic analysis because it provides an exception to the liability of the
employer for the situation in which he or she cannot exercise control.Y3
The explanation provided by economic analysis is more satisfying than
Hartkamp's justification for vicarious liability for employers, which is based on
the assumption that employers are less risk averse than victims. Even if this
might be true for a majority of employers (due, for example, to insurance), there
is no indication that the status of the victim is of any relevance to the employer's
duty to compensate. This is likely to result in inconsistent (and inefficient)
hardships when the employer is risk averse and the victim is more or less risk
neutral. Therefore, this alone is not a sufficient justification for vicarious
liability for employers. z3
The argument that the employee has insufficient incentive to take care due to
a lack of assets does not explain why employers have no right to indemnification
against the employee.238 Economic analysis may give an explanation for this
rule. The conclusion that the employee lacks incentive to take due care because
the employee has insufficient assets depends on the assumption of risk neutrality.
Most people are not risk neutral, especially not when their whole wealth is at
stake. A threat of liability to the extent of the employee's wealth is therefore

The loss that will result if an accident occurs is 100. It is efficient to take care since the cost of care
is 5 and the reduction in expected accident losses is 10. Yet, if the tortfeasor's assets are less than
20, he or she will not take care since the expected liability payments are less than the cost of taking

care. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 167.
232. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 121; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 171-73;
Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability 91 YALE L.J. 1231-82 (1984).
233. The literal test of article 6:170 § 1 is: Where an employer has control over an employee's
conduct, such an employee is liable, based on the legal relationship between the employer and the
employee, for harm to a third party caused by the attributable unlawful act of an employee if the risk
of the occurrence of such an act was increased due to the nature of the employees task.
234.

235.
236.
237.
liability.
238.

H.L. BAKELS, SCHETS VAN HET NEDERLANDS ARBEIDSTRECHT 83 (1987).

A.S. HARTKAMP, supra note 46, at 135.
W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, supra note 13, at 208-09.
Compare HR 5 Jan. 1968, 102, annot., AA 1969, 429, annot. with respect to contractual
Both would be efficient. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 171.
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just as likely to create overdeterrence as it is to create underdeterrence. Because
of overdeterrence people will take too much care, or even decide not to engage
in the activity at all, both of which would be a social waste. More importantly,
as far as people do not have a choice whether to engage in employment or not,
they would be forced to put their whole wealth at risk. Generally, the
employer's assets will be larger and they are therefore better able to bear the
risk. In relation to the employee, the employer is then less risk averse. Social
welfare will be maximized by letting the risk fall with the least risk averse party,
in this case the employer. 2 9
Finally, the rule against indemnification by the employer against the employee
saves inefficient administrative costs. Optimal incentives are provided by the
system of vicarious liability for the employee to take due care. As a general rule,
indemnification would not contribute to social welfare.2
The drafters of the NBW may have had related arguments in mind. The
general rule that employers have no right to indemnification against the
employee for unintentional torts has a broadly formulated exception. The last
sentence of article 170, section 3 NBW reads that "[qrom the circumstances of
the case, seen also in the light of the nature of [the employer and employee's]
relationship, a different result may follow. ...

."

The relationship of the employer

and the employee is explicitly mentioned as a reason to deviate from the
standard way of dividing liability. The examples the parliamentary history
present to illustrate this exception are consistent with the economic analysis of
vicarious liability. The drafters cite a case in which a CEO of a corporation
commits a tort, and a case in which torts are covered by employee's liability
insurance.2 41 The parliamentary history does not explain these examples; but
they can be explained through economic analysis. A CEO generally controls a
corporation instead of vice versa. Liability of the corporation without a right of
indemnification by the CEO would have an adverse effect on optimal deterrence.
In the case where the employee is covered by liability insurance, the employee
will be risk neutral. If the employer is more risk averse than the employee,
denial of the right to indemnification would decrease social welfare.
in summary, economic analysis supports the Netherlands rules of vicarious
liability of employers for the torts of their employees. The Netherlands rules are
based on, and limited by, the control the employer has over his or her employee.
Vicarious liability provides optimal incentives to the extent that the employer
can control the employees' activities. Furthermore, the rules of indemnification
between the employer and the employee increase social welfare because they are
aimed at letting the risk fall with the least risk averse and they prevent
inefficient administrative costs.

239. Id at 172; Sykes, supra note 232, at 1235-36.
240. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 174.
241. CJ. VAN ZEBEN & J.W. Du PON, supra note 6, at 728. The drafters name as a third
example that the employee uses his or her own car in the execution of his or her task. Both the
insurance and the control argument seem applicable here.
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C. Summary
The rules for vicarious liability are supported by economic analysis. Optimal
incentives are provided for children and employees to take due care through the
rules of vicarious liability of the parents and the employers. Arguably, strict
liability will provide potential parents with incentives to take into account the
costs that uncontrolled activities of children impose upon society. The rule of
holding employers liable rather than employees for unintentional torts
committed in the course of their employment is economically justified since this
spreading of risk increases social welfare and avoids inefficient administrative
costs.
CONCLUSION

Economic analysis of negligence and vicarious liability in Netherlands tort law
has shown that they are, in many respects, consistent with economic principles.
Netherlands tort liability can be conceived as aimed at maximizing utility while
minimizing costs.
Economic analysis, however, does not replace the traditional analysis of law.
Many aspects of the legal system can also, or sometimes better, be explained by
reasoning not related to economic principles. This does not lessen the fact that
economic analysis of law has proven to be of independent relevance to the
analysis of Netherlands tort law.
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